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STATEMENT OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
Appellee accepts Appellant's statement of jurisdiction as accurate. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
1. Did the Court of Appeals correctly construe Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-302(7) 
as to reckless disregard of obvious or known risks? 
Standard of Review: When exercising certiorari jurisdiction, the Utah 
Supreme Court reviews the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals for correctness. 
Utah v. Hansen, 63 P.3d 650, 660 (Utah 2002), citing Longley v. Leucadia 
Financial Corp.. 9 P.3d 762, 765 (Utah 2000). 
2. Did the Court of Appeals correctly construe Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-302(7) 
as to a voluntary, conscious, and intentional decision to prefer other creditors over 
the state government? 
Standard of Review: When exercising certiorari jurisdiction, the Utah 
Supreme Court reviews the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals for correctness. 
3. Did the Court of Appeals employ the correct standard of review? 
Standard of Review: When exercising certiorari jurisdiction, the Utah 
Supreme Court reviews the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals for correctness. 
Id. The additional representations set forth in Appellant's brief relating to the 
standard of review employed by the court of appeals, below, constitute part of 
Appellant's argument in this appeal, and should be construed as such. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated §59-1-302. (Included in Appellant's Addendum B) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Procedural History 
Appellee accepts as accurate the procedural history of this case as set forth 
under the subtitle "Statement of the Case" on pages 2-4 of Appellant's opening 
briefdatedOct.25,2005. 
Statement of Facts 
The underlying facts in this case are not in substantial dispute. Mr. 
Stevenson was the secretary/treasurer and one-third owner of Tower 
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Communications, Inc.. (Record at 231). The corporation failed to file and pay its 
state withholding tax returns during the second, third, and fourth quarters of 2000. 
(Record at 228). Mr. Stevenson had exclusive check signing authority for the 
company, but was not employed or compensated by the company, and was not 
responsible for nor involved in its daily business operations. (Record at 238-240). 
The day-to-day management and operations of the company were controlled 
entirely by Mr. Ken Steckelberg, the company's president. (Id.). 
Mr. Steckelberg reviewed all company bills and directed the preparation of 
all checks for Mr. Stevenson's signature. (Record at 238-240). Mr. Stevenson, 
who maintained separate full-time employment unrelated to Tower 
Communications, visited the company's office about once a month, and signed 
checks which had been prepared under the direction of Mr. Steckelberg. (Record 
at 243-246). Mr. Stevenson did not carefully review the checks when signing 
them, and also did not review any supporting documentation, because no 
documentation was provided by Mr. Steckelberg. (Id.). 
This check signing procedure was followed during each of the three quarters 
for which the taxes were not paid. During the same time period, Mr. Steckelberg 
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gave repeated assurances of the financial health and stability of the company. 
(Record at 241-242). In late November 2000, Mr. Stevenson was alerted by third 
parties to concerns about the company's finances. (Record at 245). He then set out 
to verify Mr. Steckelberg's representations of "all's well" by directly reviewing 
company financial records. (Record at 245-248). Upon his determination that the 
company's finances were not being properly managed, including his discovery, in 
November 2000, that taxes were not being paid, Mr. Stevenson, with the 
concurrance of the third business owner, Bret Cherry, fired Mr. Steckelberg, 
terminated business operations, and undertook to liquidate available assets for the 
benefit of creditors, according to their legal priorities. (Record at 248-249). 
In order to accomplish this liquidation, Mr. Stevenson was required to 
expend significant funds from his own personal resources in order to acquire 
certain claims against Tower Communications which were precluding the recovery 
of the company's largest account receivable. (Record at 259-260). Upon 
resolving such issues, all proceeds from the outstanding accounts were remitted to 
the Bank of Utah, which held and was actively asserting a first-priority security 
interest in all the liquidated assets of the company. (Record at 261-262 and 38-42). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah Code Annotated §59-l-302(7)(b) sets forth specific criteria which may 
support a finding of "willful conduct" sufficient to impose the assessment of a 
personal penalty against a responsible individual for the failure of a business entity 
to pay withholding taxes. The two criteria urged by the Utah State Tax 
Commission (hereinafter "Commission") to support the assessment of the penalty 
against Mr. Stevenson in this case are that Mr Stevenson: 
(a) recklessly disregarded obvious or known risks, which resulted in the 
failure to collect, account for, or pay over the tax (§ 59-1-302(7)(b)(ii)); and 
(b) made a voluntary, conscious, and intentional decision to prefer other 
creditors over the state government. (§ 59-1-302(7)(b)(i)) 
The court of appeals, below, correctly concluded that Mr. Stevenson does 
not meet these criteria for establishing "willful conduct" for the following reasons: 
1. Mr. Stevenson's failings in connection with the financial affairs of 
Tower Communication may have been negligent, but do not meet the legal 
definition of reckless disregard of obvious or known risks. 
There is no evidence to suggest that Mr. Steckelberg's mismanagement or 
failure to prepare appropriate checks were either known or obvious to Mr. 
Stevenson. Nor is there sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that Mr. 
Stevenson's reliance on Mr. Steckelberg's management abilities or on his 
representations regarding the financial condition of the company was 
unreasonable. When Mr. Steckelberg's mismanagement and the fact of the 
company's tax delinquency became apparent, Mr. Stevenson took immediate steps 
to replace management and terminate business operations in order to avoid the 
perpetuation of the problems which he discovered. 
In reviewing this matter on appeal, the court of appeals correctly ruled that a 
finding of reckless disregard of obvious or known risks involves mixed questions 
of law and fact. The legal portion of the analysis is the definition of "reckless 
disregard", and the factual analysis then applies the undisputed facts of this case to 
that legal standard. The correct conclusion of the court of appeals was that the 
facts presented in this case may meet the legal definition of negligence, but are not 
sufficient to support a finding of reckless disregard. 
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2. Payment of collateral proceeds to a secured creditor bank does not 
constitute a "voluntary, conscious, and intentional decision to prefer other 
creditors over the state", but is, rather, a recognition of the prior rights of the bank 
to the designated assets based upon the existence of the bank's prior lien. 
It is undisputed that the lien of the Bank of Utah encumbered the funds 
ultimately paid to the bank. Furthermore, the case law cited by both parties 
uniformly concludes that payment of encumbered funds to the creditor holding and 
asserting enforcement of its lien does not constitute the preference of another 
creditor over the state within the meaning of the penalty assessment statute. 
The only issue unresolved below was whether the Bank of Utah was 
actively asserting its lien. The court of appeals remanded the case for further 
findings on this issue. The issue of statutory priority to the encumbered funds is 
not properly before the court because it was raised for the first time on appeal. 
Even if the issue had been timely raised, however, the result would be the same 
because case law interpreting the statute establishes that the priority arises upon 
the proper filing of a warrant for the unpaid taxes, which step was never taken by 
the Commission in this case. 
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ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
In order to justify the assessment of a personal penalty against Mr. 
Stevenson based upon the failure of Tower Communications to collect, account 
for, and pay over to the state the tax obligations which are the subject of this case, 
Utah Code Annotated § 59-1-302 requires a showing that Mr. Stevenson was both 
a "responsible person" within the meaning of the statute, and that he "willfully" 
failed to account for and pay over the subject tax obligations. 
Mr. Stevenson has not disputed the finding that he was a "responsible 
person", within the meaning of the statute, but has and does dispute any assertion 
of willful failure in connection with his conduct relating to Tower 
Communications' withholding tax obligations. 
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I. THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS CORRECTLY CONSTRUED 
THE CONCEPT OF RECKLESS DISREGARD OF OBVIOUS OR 
KNOWN RISKS AS SET FORTH IN UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-1-
302(7). 
A. The Court of Appeals' Reference to Federal Case Law was 
Appropriate and Consistent with the Arguments of Both the State of 
Utah and Mr. Stevenson. 
The suggestion by the Commission that it was error for the court of appeals 
to rely upon federal case law to define willful conduct in connection with the 
assessment of personal tax penalties is inconsistent with the Commission's written 
and oral arguments below. Both before the administrative law judge, and in its 
briefing and arguments to the court of appeals, the Commission consistently used 
and relied upon the very federal case law which it now seeks to discredit. At no 
time prior to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari which initiated the present appeal 
was there any suggestion by the Commission that willfulness within the Utah 
statute relating to the assessment of personal tax penalties could or should be 
defined differently than it has been defined in the federal cases which have 
addressed and defined the term. The failure of the Commission to assert the 
claimed impropriety of reliance upon federal case law either before the 
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administrative law judge or before the Utah Court of Appeals precludes reliance 
upon such argument in its present appeal. Bailey-Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurzet. 945 
P.2d 180 (Utah App. 1997); Higgins v. City of Fillmore. 639 P.2d 192, 194 (Utah 
1981). 
Furthermore, the very language of Utah Code Annotated §59-l-302(7)(b), is 
not only patterned after, but uses almost the precise language of the federal cases. 
For purposes of comparison, the text of §59-l-302(7)(b) is as follows: 
(b) It is prima facie evidence that a person has willfully failed to collect, 
truthfully account for, or pay over any of the taxes listed in 
Subsection (1) if the commission or a court finds that the person 
charged with the responsibility of collecting, accounting for, or 
paying over the taxes; (i) made a voluntary, conscious, and intentional 
decision to prefer other creditors over the state government or utilize 
the tax money for personal purposes; (ii) recklessly disregarded 
obvious or known risks, which resulted in the failure to collect, 
account for, or pay over the tax; or (iii) failed to investigate or to 
correct mismanagement, having noticed that the tax was not or is not 
being collected, accounted for, or paid over as provided by law. 
Utah Code Annotated §59-l-302(7)(b)(emphasis added). In the case ofPenbov. 
U.S.. 988 F.2d 1029 (10th Circuit 1993), the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals 
summarizes the federal case law used to define the term "willfulness" as follows: 
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Willfulness, in the context of §6672 [which is the provision of the 
Internal Revenue Code which authorizes the personal penalty tax 
assessments at the federal level], means a "voluntary, conscious and 
intentional decision to prefer other creditors over the government." 
(Citing Burden v. United States. 486 F.2d 302, 304 (10th Circuit 
1973)). . . . Although negligence does not give rise to §6672 liability, 
"
4[t]he willfulness requirement is . . . met if the responsible officer 
shows a "reckless disregard of a known or obvious risk that trust 
funds may not be remitted to the government.... '"" Smith v. United 
States, 894 F.2d 1549, 1554 n.5 (11th Circuit 1990) (quoting 
Thibodeau v. United States. 828 F.2d 1499, 1505 (11th Circuit 1987). 
A responsible person's failure to investigate or to correct 
mismanagement after being notified that withholding taxes have not 
been paid satisfies the §6672 willfulness requirement. (Citing Mazo 
v. United States. 591 F.2d 1151, 1154 (5th Circuit 1979). 
Denbo v. United States. 988 F.2d at 1033 (emphasis added). In its argument, the 
Commission does not suggest, and has never suggested, a definition of willfulness 
that is not consistent with these federal case holdings, nor is any other meaning 
suggested by the language of the statute, itself. 
B. There is No Lack of Uniformity on the Definition of Willfullness 
Among the Federal Court Cases that have Interpreted the Term. 
Argument LB. of Appellant's opening brief, which begins on page 13 
thereof, suggests, by its title, that there is a lack of uniformity among the federal 
court cases which define the term willfullness for purposes of the assessment of 
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federal tax penalties. The argument which follows the title, however, contains no 
reference to any divergence in the interpretation of the term "willfullness" within 
the federal cases. On the contrary, the argument set forth on pages 13-15 
addresses the "reasonable cause" defense to a personal penalty assessment, which 
defense has been recognized by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Finley v. 
United States, 123 F.3d 1342 (10th Cir. 1997). 
While the Commission's argument accurately reflects that the "reasonable 
cause" defense is not uniformly accepted or interpreted among the federal circuits, 
it is inaccurate to suggest any significant divergence among the circuits on the 
definition of "willfiillness" with respect to the assessment of personal penalties for 
failure to pay business withholding taxes. It is also of significance to note that the 
issue of whether or not the court of appeals properly recognized a "reasonable 
cause" defense is not one of the issues which has been designated by this court as 
a part of the present appeal. 
The court of appeals did agree with parts of the analysis in Finley, but it is 
not accurate to suggest that the court below relied upon the "reasonable cause" 
defense as a basis for its decision. The court of appeals simply noted that the 
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issues that could be reviewed by the administrative law judge on remand should, if 
the Commission establishes its prima facie case, include facts relating to any 
asserted "reasonable cause" defense. (See Addendum A to Appellant's Brief, at 
pages 9-10) 
C. Mr. Stevenson's Conduct Relating to the Financial Control of 
Tower Communications does not Constitute a "Reckless Disregard of 
Obvious or Known Risks." 
As indicated by the undisputed facts in this case, Mr. Stevenson was not 
deeply involved in the business operations of Tower Communications. He did 
have exclusive check-signing authority, but such authority was exercised by 
simply signing groups of checks presented to him by Mr. Steckelberg, the 
company's president and operating manager, without reviewing either the 
individual checks or any supporting documentation. His proceeding in such a 
manner was based upon the continuing representations of Mr. Steckelberg that the 
company was in good financial condition and all operations were proceeding 
normally. With the benefit of hindsight, it is now easy to conclude that Mr. 
Stevenson would have been better off not to rely upon Mr. Steckelberg's 
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representations. However, such reliance does not amount to reckless disregard of 
obvious or known risks because Mr. Steckelberg's mismanagement was neither 
known or obvious. When risks are neither known nor obvious, being unaware of 
them does not constitute reckless disregard. In re Premo. 116 B.R. 515, 534 
(Bankr. E.D.Mich 1990) 
Courts have consistently ruled that negligent conduct is not a sufficient 
basis upon which to find a willful failure in connection with the payment of 
withheld taxes. Denbo v. U.S.. 988 F.2d at 1033; Brown v. U.S.. 552 F. Stipp. 
622, 644 (N.D. 111. 1982), citing Feist v. U.S.. 607 F.2d 954, 957 (Ct. CI. 1979) 
The case of Hammon v. U.S.. 21 Ct.C1.14 (Ct. CI. 1990), contains an 
excellent discussion of the differing factual scenarios that yield differing results in 
connection with the issue of "reckless disregard". In Hammon. the court finds 
reckless disregard by a corporate officer who gave financial control over his 
company to an individual who had a known history of disregarding tax liabilities, 
but declined to find reckless disregard by the same corporate officer who hired a 
different financial advisor in another company and, even though taxes became 
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delinquent in the second company as well, "had no reason to be wary of tax 
nonpayment risk" at the time the delinquencies arose. Id at 30. 
The basic elements of negligence include the existence of a duty of care, the 
breach of that duty, and the existence of damages flowing from such breach. As 
confirmed in the present decision of the court of appeals, the findings of the 
administrative law judge in this case support only a legal conclusion of 
negligence. The administrative law judge, in her original analysis, impliedly 
found that Mr. Stevenson had a duty to monitor the checks that were being signed 
to make sure that payments were being made for withholding taxes, even though 
Mr. Stevenson was unaware of anything in Mr. Steckelberg's conduct that would 
have raised his suspicions. The judge also found that Mr. Stevenson failed to meet 
that duty, and that the taxes were not paid as a result of such failure. Without 
something more to meet the element of "an obvious or known risk", the facts 
support only a finding of negligence, and the finding of reckless disregard was 
properly reversed. 
II THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY INTERPRETED AND 
APPLIED UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-1-302(7) IN DETERMINING 
THAT MR. STEVENSON DID NOT IMPROPERLY PREFER 
OTHER CREDITORS OVER THE STATE GOVERNMENT. 
A. The Payment of the Proceeds of Encumbered Collateral to a 
Secured Creditor is not a Proper Basis for a Finding of Preferring a 
Creditor over the State for Purposes of a Personal Penalty 
Assessment. 
Even though there is no prior case law in the State of Utah which construes 
the meaning of the phrase "preferring a creditor over the state" for purposes of 
personal tax penalty assessments, the concept embodied in the phrase is discussed 
in In re Premo. The bankruptcy court in In re Premo, and other courts which have 
construed the "preferring a creditor" concept, have uniformly held that payments 
of encumbered collateral to secured creditors who are actively asserting their liens 
do not constitute an impermissible preference of another creditor over the taxing 
entity. In re Premo. 116 B.R. at 535, citing Slodov v. U.S.. 436 U.S. 238 (1978) 
and Brown v. U.S.. 591. F2d 1136, 1141 (5th Cir. 1979). 
Because there is no dispute that the Bank of Utah was a secured creditor 
holding a properly-perfected security interest in the funds at issue in this case, the 
uniform interpretation of the provision relating to preferring a creditor over the 
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state, which excludes the payment of encumbered collateral to secured creditors, 
was properly followed by the court of appeals in this case. The question of 
whether the Bank of Utah was actively asserting its lien priority was remanded by 
the court of appeals for further consideration below, and, therefore, need not be 
considered further in this appeal. 
B. Mr. Stevenson's Purchase of Corporate Creditor Claims Did Not 
Constitute The Use of Personal Funds For Corporate Purposes. 
The facts in this case, as correctly found by the administrative law judge, 
originally, included the finding that "petitioner personally purchased the claims of 
the sub-contractors, which held potential lien rights against Tower." (see 
Addendum C to Appellant's Brief, at page 3). In its brief, the Commission cites 
the case of Sorenson v. United States, 521 F.2d 325 (9th Cir. 1975), to continue its 
argument that the "payment of corporate obligations" was a basis upon which a 
court could determine that personal funds were converted into funds of the 
corporation, thereby making them available for the payment of tax obligations. 
Though its ultimate conclusion, that the Sorenson case is distinguishable from the 
present case, is correct, Mr. Stevenson asserts that the distinctions are even 
broader than those found by the court of appeals in the following particulars: 
1. In Sorenson. corporate obligations other than the tax debts were 
satisfied. In the present case, the corporate obligations which were 
purchased by Mr. Stevenson are still unpaid. The only change which has 
occurred relative to the corporation is that the claims are now held by Mr. 
Stevenson against the corporation, rather than by the individual creditors to 
whom the claims were originally owed. 
2. The only corporate obligation that was satisfied in the present case 
ahead of the state tax obligation was the admittedly secured claim of the 
Bank of Utah. As indicated above, because all funds used to pay such claim 
were fully encumbered by the bank's prior lien, there is no proper legal 
basis for the conclusion that the payments to the Bank of Utah constituted 
an impermissible preference of the bank over the State of Utah. 
Significantly, the administrative law judge did not make a finding that Mr. 
Stevenson's acquisition of the claims of corporate creditors constituted an 
impermissible preference of such creditors. The sole basis articulated by the 
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administrative law judge for her finding that Mr. Stevenson "made a voluntary 
conscious and intentional decision to prefer [other creditors]" was that the 
payment made to the Bank of Utah rather than the state constituted such an 
impermissible preference, (see Appellant's Addendum C, at page 5) 
C. The Commission's Reliance on Utah Code Annotated § 59-10-
406(6) is Unavailing. 
On pages 20-21 of the Commission's opening brief, the Commission 
attempts to bolster its argument that Mr. Stevenson preferred other creditors over 
the state by arguing that the state may have held a priority lien against the funds in 
question. This argument is based upon Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-406(6), which 
statutory section does include language relating to liens which arise against 
employer's assets upon the employer's failure to remit trust fund taxes to the state. 
The Commission complains, on page 20 of its brief, that "the court of appeals 
ignored the fact that these tax payments were 'trust funds' of the state." The most 
likely reason for the court of appeals' ignoring such issue is the fact that neither 
the argument nor the referenced statute were ever mentioned or relied upon in the 
prior arguments before the administrative law judge or in the briefing to the court 
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of appeals. Because the argument was not properly raised below, it may not be 
considered in this appeal. Bailey-Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurzet 945 P.2d 180 (Utah 
App. 1997); Higgins v. City of Fillmore. 639 P.2d 192, 194 (Utah 1981). 
Even if the procedural impropriety of reference to the statute is ignored, the 
cited provision, and its analysis under existing case law, do not support the 
Commission's present argument. In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wagstaff 450 P.2d 
100 (Utah 1969), this court interpreted a prior version of the statute presently 
being asserted by the Commission and ruled "that the lien of the state for 
delinquent withholding taxes begins to run at the time notice thereof is given by 
filing the warrant." Id. at 102. Because there is no evidence in this case of the 
filing of any warrant by the Commission, and certainly no indication that any such 
warrant predates the properly-perfected lien of the Bank of Utah, there is simply 
no basis for arguing that this statutory provision has any application to the present 
case. 
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III. THE COURT OF APPEALS USED THE CORRECT 
STANDARD OF REVIEW IN CONSIDERING THE LEGAL 
AND FACTUAL ISSUES BEFORE IT. 
The essential position of the Commission with respect to the standard of 
review to be used by the court of appeals is that the court of appeals should have 
given more deference to the rulings made by the administrative law judge. The 
error in the argument of the Commission is that not all of the critical decisions and 
rulings made by the administrative law judge were findings of fact. As discussed 
in the court of appeals' decision, the issue of willfulness presents mixed questions 
of law and fact (see Appellant's Addendum A, at page 3). The definition of the 
term "willfulness" is a question of law, subject to de novo review by an appellate 
court. Rvkoff v. U.S.. 40 F.3d 305. 307-308 (9th Cir. 1994). Applying that 
definition to particular facts requires factual findings, but, again, the determination 
of whether a prima facie case has been established is a question of law. Sheikh v. 
Department of Public Safety. 901 P.2d 1103, 1105 (Utah App. 1995). 
The crux of the legal mistake which was found by the court of appeals to 
have been made by the administrative law judge was that conduct which fit the 
legal definition of negligence, a question of law, was found by the administrative 
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law judge to be willful conduct. None of the arguments or authorities cited by the 
Commission require the court of appeals to give any deference to legal 
determinations made by the administrative law judge which the appellate court 
finds to be erroneous. 
CONCLUSION 
The conclusions of the administrative law judge in the present case were 
based upon errors of law relating to the definition of the elements of "reckless 
disregard", and also the relative priority of secured claims against corporate assets. 
As a result of such legal errors, the decision of the administrative law judge was 
properly reversed by the court of appeals. The decision of the court of appeals 
should be affirmed. 
DATED this /*Aiay of November, 2005. 
Noel S. Hyde 
Attorney for Eric Stevenson, Appellee 
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